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Budget Policy A Politica
and Fiscal Crisis Matrix
Francis J. Leaz.es, Jr.
Robert Sieczkiewicz
A study of 134 Rhode Island programs, administered during the state's budget crisis in
the fiscal years 1987 to 1991, yielded a number of important lessons. The more man-
datedformula spending there was in a budget, the more uncontrollable was the budget.
There is a spending bias ingrained in the political culture. Some nonentitlement spend-
ing can be difficult to curtail. Cutback management strategies are inadequate to address
significant revenue shortfalls. The authors present a political budget matrix designed to
assist budget policymakers and staff in making educated assumptions about the way cat-
egories ofprograms may be treated during times of severe fiscal stress. The matrix takes
into account such elements as formulas, labor intensity, and position on the political
agenda.
What a revolting development!" declared Riley, the beloved 1950s television charac-
ter, as he faced yet another family dilemma. He summed up the feelings of north-
eastern state legislators and their budget staffs as they struggle with endless red ink.
Tough choices continue to face the lawmakers — cut spending and/or raise taxes.
Budgeting is a political act. Our budgetary matrix is designed to help budget policy-
makers and staffs make educated assumptions, perhaps even forecasts, about the way
programs may be treated during periods of fiscal stress. The matrix can also assist in
understanding the degree to which incrementalism remains in place during fiscal crisis.
And, to assess the results of decremental budgeting, it determines whether the budget
produces marginal downward spending adjustments or a more fundamental shift of
resources from one program to another. We used the budgetary results for 1 34 Rhode
Island programs for fiscal years 1987-1991 to develop the matrix. With each program
having a more than $1 million appropriation in FY 1991, the total made up 95 percent
of all state spending. The matrix subsequently was used to assess the budget outcomes
of FY 1991-1992.
Four general lessons that have universal applicability for state-level budget policy-
makers emerged from the analysis. The first is not new, having been discussed at length
in budgeting literature: the more mandated formula spending under current law, the
more uncontrollable the budget. 1 A budget that is heavily entitled cannot be readily
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adjusted nor can outlays be controlled through the annual appropriations process. The
budget is vulnerable because, when appropriations are left open-ended to accommodate
formula requirements and cost of living adjustments, the government becomes less able
to respond to unfavorable revenue forecasts and economic projections.
Another key lesson, also not new, is that a clear governmental spending bias is in-
grained in the political culture. 2 That bias remains in place in times of fiscal crisis, even
when political "no new taxes" promises have reduced a state's revenue-raising capacity.
In this study of five fiscal years, more than half the state's spending, including nonenti-
tlement expenditures, occurred at rates exceeding any reasonable definition of incremen-
talism— the habitual small, upward-creeping tendencies of budgets so often associated
with public budgeting^ Rhode Island's spending continued unabated throughout the
early years of the fiscal crisis.
The third lesson is that nonentitlement programs which are high on the political
agenda, and in which there is significant political elite involvement, are as hard to con-
trol as entitlements. However, while it can be difficult to control nonentitlement spend-
ing, far more nonentitlement programs can be cut.
The fourth lesson is that short-term cutback strategies are woefully inadequate to
address significant revenue shortfalls. 4 Our analysis begins with this last, but important
point.
Traditional cutback management techniques were dutifully used to address the crisis.
Once these tough-choice avoidance strategies were exhausted, policymakers turned to
program reductions. The matrix describes succinctly the outcomes of their eventual
choices.
The Political Response to the Emerging Budget Crisis
Rhode Island was a victim of its own success in raising revenues and expanding ser-
vices during the 1980s. A sudden early-to-mid-decade boom economy flooded the state
treasury with new revenues. Yet state government spending outpaced its revenues as
spending initiatives blossomed (see Table 1). The governor and legislature showed no
inclination to restrain their largess during that period.
Table 1
Comparing Revenues and Expenditures
Fiscal Years 1986-1990







1987 1,165.8 14.0 1,130.9 7.5
1988 1,247.9 7.0 1,255.7 11.0
1989 1,293.2 3.6 1,399.7 11.5
1990 1,374.0 6.3 1,489.7 6.4
Source: State of Rhode Island, Department of Administration, budgets as enacted for the appropriate year.
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The boom years also witnessed an increase in the state's revenue-raising capacity.
Rhode Island's tax power is historically below the national average, but its tax effort
is often above the national average (see Figure 1). During the mid-1980s Rhode Island
reduced its tax effort by enacting a series of rate reductions in its income tax, which is a
"piggyback" on the federal tax. By 1988, at the outset of the fiscal crisis, the state's tax
capacity and effort were approaching the national norms. As Figure 1 clearly shows,
from that point on tax capacity and effort diverged sharply, a direct result of the fiscal
crisis.
Figure 1
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Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "1991 State Fiscal Capacity and Effort"
(Washington, D.C.: ACIR, August 1993).
Underlying the apparently healthy 1980s economy were troubling indicators pointing
to the boom's really being a "blip." Policymakers ignored forecast data warning of
future trouble. Single-housing permit applications, which are consistently cited as indi-
cators of the robustness of the state's overall economic health, declined precipitously
after their peak in 1986 (see Figure 2). Despite a number of lesser peaks, the trend was
clearly downward. The warning sign went unheeded, however. State spending continued
to grow.
Other ominous signposts appeared in the years following, but state spending pro-
ceeded unabated through fiscal years 1988 and 1989. The prime lending rate rose
throughout the last few years of the decade. Rhode Island housing prices continued to
increase. Rising mortgage rates and housing prices meant that fewer Rhode Islanders
were able to afford a home. After peaking in 1988, housing sales declined rapidly.
By fiscal 1989-1990, significant political capital had accrued to both the legislature
and governor because state income tax rates were reduced four times between 1986 and
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1988. All the while revenues continued to rise. However, Rhode Island officeholders
reluctantly cashed in this political capital to overcome fiscal stress once revenues began
to decline.
Figure 2
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The Cutback Management Response
Once the state's budget began to bleed in fiscal year 1988-1989, and hemorrhaged be-
tween 1990 and 1992, past spending commitments were threatened. The gap between
the needs and expectations of citizens and government employees for public services
and benefits widened. The economy could not generate enough growth to sustain
tax supported programs without putting unacceptable demands on taxpayers. The new
federalism, a seeming "shift and shaft," continued to strain the state coffers.
Tough choices faced the Rhode Island legislature as it struggled to meet the state
constitution's balanced budget requirement. Repeatedly, state revenues did not meet
forecasted expectations. Fiscal year 1989-1990 saw the emergence of an $86.8 million
deficit on a total state budget of about $1.49 billion. Fiscal 1990-1991 realized a nearly
$200 million shortfall.
In mid-decade, policymakers had taken a few tentative steps toward developing a
financial emergency plan. In 1984 the legislators created a "rainy day" fund, the State
Budget Reserve and Cash Stabilization Account. When the first deficit appeared in
1989-1990, the $57 million in that account was depleted almost overnight.
The initial political response of the Rhode Island legislature and governor in the de-
clining revenue years of fiscal 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 was to combine traditional
cutback management techniques with revenue "enhancements" and a small personal in-
come tax increased Any major increases in personal or corporate income tax rates were
not deemed politically possible as both governors in office during the crisis took the no-
new-taxes pledge. Nevertheless, the state's tax effort increased while its capacity began
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to decrease as a recession began to take hold. During 1989-1990, traditional cutback
management strategies to reduce personnel costs took center stage. An early retirement
program was put in place. More than 700 state employees took advantage of an offer
"they couldn't refuse." The expected short-term savings were offset somewhat by per-
sonnel's rehiring under the state seventy-five-day rule or as consultants. Shifting state-
revenue-supported employees to federal "soft money" also became a strategy of choice.
In fiscal year 1990-1991, revenue enhancements came to the forefront, furthering the
gap between tax capacity and effort. The principal steps taken were to:
• increase user fees for motor vehicle registration and other services, including the
beloved vanity license plates;
• enact a state sunset sales tax increase that raised the tax from 6 to 7 percent, to be
phased out over the two subsequent years;
• expand the sales tax to incorporate periodicals;
• increase the state "sin" taxes on alcohol and tobacco as well as the gasoline tax;
the latter was increased twice in one year, placing it among the highest in
the nation;
• cancel the one percent Public Service Corporation tax reduction scheduled for
FY 1991;
• employ creative accounting to define when and how certain receivables would be
reported.
Structural changes in the activities supporting the budget process appeared as well.
During the last few fiscal years the revenue and spending forecasts of the governor's
staff and the legislative fiscal advisers were often in conflict because of different fore-
casting techniques. To iron them out, a revenue-estimating conference made up of the
state's budget officer and the House and Senate fiscal advisers was established in the
hope that their combined strengths would improve the quality of forecasts.6
None of the strategies worked. Forecasted expenditures for 1990-1991 kept changing
for the worse throughout the fall of 1990. By the time a new governor was sworn into
office in January 1991, the original FY 1990-1991 budget as enacted was projected to
produce a $200 million shortfall, excluding the cost of a looming statewide credit union
bailout.
When the potential long-term severity of the crisis emerged during FY 1990-1991,
the new governor proposed a midyear adjusted budget package that the legislature
quickly passed. The new strategy for coping with fiscal disaster was primarily designed
to reduce payroll. The governor proposed and negotiated a ten-day pay deferral plan
with state worker and college faculty unions that included an additional nineteen salary
deferral days in the following fiscal year. Over 500 layoffs in a state work force of
approximately 18,000 were ordered. The state's contribution to the State Teacher's
Retirement Fund was deferred.
Unfortunately, fiscal 1991-1992 was no better. Almost immediately the governor had
to submit a budget containing the already negotiated pay deferrals and a continuation
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of the retirement fund strategy. Increases in the personal income tax, however, were off
the political table. Reducing program spending took the spotlight— and continues.
A Budget Politics Matrix
Programs are never equal in the competition for finite and shrinking resources. The re-
duced likelihood of "fair share" increases to cover future costs of current services, or
actual cuts in an agency's budget base, even if seemingly decremental ones, makes bud-
getary competition fierce. The contest becomes even more intense when large portions
of the state budget are uncontrollable, whether because of mandated formulas or rough-
and-tumble "politics."
Partisans strive to assure that their programs receive their fair share, a "fairness fac-
tor" measured here by the percentage increase above or below the median growth rate
for all programs. For all programs it was an aggregate 37.9 percent over the five years
of the study or roughly 7.5 percent each year. This occurred despite the Rhode Island
governor's having, by statute, to recommend to the legislature a budget not to exceed
5.5 percent of the previous year's enacted budget.
There is also a track record with regard to programs' winning their budget share.
This "win-lose" account is measured by whether a program's rate of budgetary growth
remained steady or was interrupted during the five-year period. Interrupted growth
means that a program's budgetary history reflected a pattern of above or below median
growth in one year, followed by a subsequent year of no growth or decline, then a sub-
sequent upward rebound and such.
Table 2 presents a budget politics matrix that explains programs' relative budget suc-
cess or failure in protecting their base and obtaining a fair share. Each cell has a label
reflecting the success or failure experienced over the five years of the study: Big Win-
ners, Sprinters, Steady Plodders, and Big Losers.
Knowing whether a program wins or loses its fair share is helpful, but identifying the
characteristics associated with winning or losing is also important. We chose the follow-
ing five criteria commonly found in the public budgeting literature associated with
spending decisions to perform the analysis: (1) whether program spending was formula
mandated; (2) whether the program was labor intensive, with more than 70 percent of
its dollars having been allotted to personnel costs; 7 (3) a program's gaining a place on
the state's political agenda— such access requires widespread attention, a concern that
action is required, and a public perception that the matter is appropriate for govern-
ment; 8 (4) the level of political advocacy for a program;
9 and (5) the degree to which the
program was a product of a special interest of an individual lawmaker or group of legis-
lators that do not constitute a major voting bloc — those who have adequate political
capital to invest in the continuation of their "pet projects." Table 3 summarizes the polit-
ical characteristics of each cell.
Analysis
Between 1987 and 1991, when the crisis emerged and the budget subsequently hemor-
rhaged, a spending bias generally continued to manifest itself. Half of all the pro-
grams expanded at rates above the median growth rate, accounting for nearly 60 per-
cent of total state spending.
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Table 2
Rhode Island State Spending: Fiscal Years 1987-1991
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31 Total programs 23%
t5 Total spending 33%
3 Formula programs 3%
<D Formula spending 23%
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7 Labor-int. programs 5%
Labor-int. spending .2%
20 Multivar. programs 15%
Multivar. spending 9%







Cell III - Steady Plodders
12 Total program 9%
Total spending 10%
2 Formula programs 1%
Formula spending 2%
10 Nonformula programs 7%
Nonformula spending 8%
Nonformula Summary
8 Labor-int. progams 6%
Labor-int. spending 7%
1 Multivar. program .5%
Multivar. spending .7%
1 Pet Program .5%
Pet spending .3%
Interrupted Growth
Cell II - Sprinters
36 Total programs 27%
Total spending 25%
7 Formula programs 5%
Formula spending 13%
29 Nonformula programs 22%
Nonformula spending 12%
9 Labor-int. programs 7%
Labor-int. spending 2%
14 Multivar. programs 11%
Multivar. spending 9%
6 Pet programs 4%
Pet spending 1%
Cell IV - Big Losers
55 Total programs 41%
Total spending 27%
9 Formula programs 7%
Formula spending 7%
46 Nonformula programs 34%
Nonformula spending 20%
38 Labor-int. programs 28%
Labor-int. spending 18%
6 Multivar. program 5%
Multivar. spending 2%
2 Pet programs 1%
Pet spending .2%
Note: Program percentage: of total programs. Spending percentage: of total spending.
Multivar. = in crisis; high on agenda; high advocacy.
Big Winners
Cell I contains the true uncontrollables — the Big Winners that made up 33 percent of
Rhode Island state spending. During 1987-1991 these programs grew at rates far
exceeding the 7.5 percent median growth rate for all programs. The degree to which a
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Table 3
Political Matrix of Budget Control






































budget can be controlled and adjusted in times of fiscal stress depends on keeping the
amount of Big Winner spending to a minimum. Cutting the Big Winner programs,
that is, moving them out of the uncontrollable arena, is difficult because such an action
may have a perceived or real long-term electoral impact on the legislature, or require
that the problem be "solved" or redefined in some way.
Two-thirds of Rhode Island Big Winner entitlement spending derived from the politi-
cally sensitive, formula-driven State Support for Local School Operations. That pro-
gram, which accounts for about 20 percent of all state spending, grew at an average
annual rate of nearly 1 1 percent over the five years. 10
Nonentitlement Big Winners are high-visibility programs, sometimes in crisis, that
have generated broad coalitions to support spending. The state's consistent nonentitle-
ment Big Winner policy areas were mental health programs and corrections. Six percent
of total state spending in fiscal 1990 was for mental health services.
The Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH) deinstitution-
alization effort was the prime beneficiary. For example, the Mental Retardation Com-
munity Services Program, Community Mental Health Program, Community Mental
Health Plan, and Mental Health Services for Children grew at average annual rates
of 22 percent, 18 percent, 10 percent, and 44 percent, respectively.
Rhode Island's correctional system was, until recently, in crisis. The state operated
under a federal district court order to reduce overcrowding at the state Adult Correc-
tional Institute. The facilities unit received an increase of 74 percent over the five
years to help alleviate the strain. With the public's view of the need for increased public
safety, corrections fared well.
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Sprinters
The Sprinters tasted the thrill of victory — growth rates above the median, sometimes
significantly so. They also knew the agony of defeat — years when spending increases
fell well below the median or declined. These programs waffle between being highly
visible, crisis oriented, and less visible "pets." Most of them are nonentitlement pro-
grams that account for half the spending in the category. As with Big Winners, fewer
Sprinter entitlements make up half the spending in this category. The state's share of
Medicaid is a Sprinter because of factors such as the unemployment rate during that
period.
The Sprinters are on the Big Winner political waiting list. They are difficult to con-
trol because they have many legislative advocates. Yet they have not developed or sus-
tained a broad enough coalition to garner large, consistent increases in their budget, or
to stave off cuts. The significant increases they do receive cluster in years when they
receive special attention.
If they experience a highly visible crisis, they sprint ahead budgetarily for a short
period. For example, the Rhode Island Department for Children and Their Families has
been roundly criticized for its performance ever since its creation more than a decade
ago. The deaths of children, allegations of staff misconduct, and other assorted com-
plaints have kept the department in crisis. The political response has been to increase
spending when the complaints reach crisis proportion. So over the five years, spending
for community services for children has increased by 13 percent, direct services by 9
percent, and the board and care of children in private homes by 8 percent.
At the opposite end of the Sprinter spectrum are those programs which forge ahead
precisely because they are not highly visible but have strong legislative advocates.
Being a "pet" can help keep growth rates above the median, but that is no insurance
against periodic cuts. Programs such as Community Service Grants, Pathways to Inde-
pendence, and Alternative Care for the Elderly have grown at above median rates in a
couple of years, but have experienced no growth in others during the same five-year
period. One key, then, to control of spending is to keep Sprinters from acquiring Big
Winner status, either by solving their problems or by keeping individual program advo-
cates from developing broader support.
Steady Plodders
The striking characteristic of the Steady Plodders is their low number. Rhode Island's
classic incremental growth pool of programs has shrunk, totaling only 10 percent of
state spending and about 9 percent of the programs. They grew at a consistent annual 5
percent rate over five years, staying within the budget cap and below the median. These
Steady Plodders are institutionalized, mostly labor intensive, rarely in crisis, and low on
the political agenda. Only two are formula based.
The Steady Plodders are valued, but not visible, somewhat woven into the political
fabric of the state. There is general agreement that they are a product of past polit-
ical decisions and ought not to be greatly tinkered with. However, those which are labor
intensive teeter on the brink of becoming Big Losers. A classic example is the incre-
mental growth of the MHRH-run General Hospital, which is highly labor intensive and
whose budget grew at a rate of just under 5 percent.
Big Losers
The Big Losers are controllable. Little apparent political "blame" is assessed as a result
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of their being cut. Although there is no question that government ought to be involved in
these policy areas, the extent of commitment is open to debate. The programs may not
be high on the political agenda, are not in sensitive crisis policy areas, and their political
advocates may no longer be members of the legislature. There are virtually no pets
among them.
Because they are labor intensive and may have the capacity to raise their own rev-
enue, these programs provide the best opportunity for immediate savings. Forty-one
percent of the 134 programs are labor intensive. Nearly 70 percent of all labor-intensive
programs are Big Losers, but the fifty-five of them account for only 18 percent of state
spending.
One major policy area reflecting the Big Loser syndrome is higher education, the
most visible and largest of all. A labor-intensive policy area, it has the perceived ability
to "raise" its own revenues, a quality of dubious value in times of crisis. Rhode Island
support for higher education has dropped from nearly 80 percent of higher education
revenues in 1987 to about 50 percent by FY 1992.
Many Big Loser programs typically offer a political advantage as well because they
typically have virtually no advocates. Many of them are related to central managerial
functions such as auditing, inspecting, and purchasing. These programs have experi-
enced budget decrements in their base.
Eventually, the Big Loser portion of the budget could shrink to relative insignifi-
cance. The state will then be forced to determine whether it should continue to finance
any of the current programs in that category. In higher education, the three state institu-
tions are better characterized as state assisted rather than state supported. In other areas,
government would have to abandon some general operations, a clearly impractical
choice unless it wanted to go out of business entirely.
1991-1992 Outcomes
The matrix proved useful in tracking the results for programs during fiscal year 1991 —
1992, which in the five previous years had fallen into each of the four cells. Overall,
real cuts did take place. The median "growth" rate for all programs was a negative 9.7
percent — a sign of the truly desperate budget situation. It would be expected that the
Big Winners and Steady Plodders would fare best under these draconian conditions.
Conversely, Sprinters would not be able to sprint, and Big Losers would teeter on the
edge of extinction. For the most part, expectations were borne out.
While all categories of programs suffered cuts, the Big Winners and Steady Plodders
of the five previous fiscal years were able to fend off cuts or minimize their losses
more effectively than the Sprinters and Big Losers. We defined budget effectiveness as
maintaining a positive growth rate in the budget enacted for FY 1991-1992. Programs
realized minimized losses when funded at their FY 1991 level or when the cuts they
sustained were less than the median reduction of 9.7 percent. Those whose cuts were
greater than that took the "big hits."
Big Winners and Steady Plodders enjoyed protection from major budget cuts.Pro-
grams in both categories continued to grow and to avoid serious cuts more effectively
than Sprinters and Big Losers. Better than half the Big Losers continued to suffer losses
greater than the median, and the Sprinters did not sprint that year. The safest programs
in difficult budget times are entitlements. Almost 50 percent of them continued to grow
and another quarter minimized losses. The pay deferrals and layoffs are reflected in the
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labor-intensive programs, of which nearly two-thirds had to absorb significant cuts.
Recommendations
As a result of using the matrix and piecing together the history of the Rhode Island bud-
get crisis, we determined that fiscal trouble looms when, in tandem,
• government officials ignore early economic stress indicators;
• small revenue enhancements and cutback management becomes the principal polit-
ical strategy for coping with declining state tax receipts;
• state government spending programs during good economic times are characterized
by new or expanded entitlements and result in a large part of a state's budget
becoming uncontrollable;
• entitlement and nonentitlement spending continues to grow even after a fiscal crisis
arises.
When cutback management strategies appear as solutions to potentially major fiscal
problems, budget staffs must be prepared to argue for a more aggressive approach to
avert a likely hemorrhage. Although cutback advocates have recognized the problem,
they are only forestalling tough decisions, making the longer-term choices more diffi-
cult. Administrative savings will not pay for the above-median growth rate of programs.
The premise supporting the matrix is that the ability to foresee severe budgetary
stress comes from watching political behavior and understanding past political decision-
sem-bedded in the budget. In Rhode Island, incremental growth continued for some
programs and agencies throughout the crisis because they are in the entitlement classifi-
cation and therefore high on the political agenda. Budget controllability shrinks in pro-
portion to the growth of these Big Winner and Sprinter categories. The Steady Plodders,
like the proverbial tortoise, move onward almost unnoticed. Decrements appeared for a
few entitlements, but were felt mostly by nonentitlement programs. Decrements, almost
inevitably, are felt by relatively low-spending, labor-intensive, less-visible, general oper-
ations of government — the Big Losers. Programs with a separate revenue-raising
capacity may find their state appropriation cut. Spending as a percentage of the total
shifts from nonentitlement to entitlement programs, further increasing the potential un-
controllability of state spending.
Our matrix ought to be viewed as a guide, one that can change just as politics can
shift. Budget staffs ought to track regularly which programs are Big Winners, Sprint-
ers, Steady Plodders, and Big Losers. Programs fall in and out of crisis, become more
stable or institutionalized, acquire advocates, and lose their visibility. Consequently a
program can, over time, shift from one cell to another. The matrix is a useful tool for
assessing the overall composition of those changes, namely, to determine the degree to
which a budget becomes uncontrollable. Because each state is unique, some time will
have to be spent developing those characteristics which address a state's own political
environment.
Undoubtedly, budget choices are difficult and complex. There is little incentive for
legislators to cut services or raise taxes. Our general conclusion is not revolutionary.
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It takes political will to bring spending under control, and that appears only after all cut-
back strategies have been exhausted. Legislators cannot wave a magic wand, nor can
their budget staffs "click" with a computer mouse to make these "revolting develop-
ments" disappear. &
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